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tax notes
Upstairs, Downstairs: Retained
Interests and Estate of Stewart

VI.

By John A. Bogdanski
John A. Bogdanski is the Douglas K. Newell Faculty
Scholar and a professor of law at Lewis & Clark Law
School in Portland, Ore.
Section 2036(a) hauls back into a decedent’s gross
estate, for federal estate tax purposes, property that
she gave away while alive, if the decedent retained at
death the income from the property or the right to
designate who should enjoy or possess the property.
Routinely applied to trusts, this provision has also
been held applicable to other types of retained interests, including interests in property transferred to
family partnerships and family limited liability companies. Quite often, applying section 2036(a) unravels
valuation discounts that the decedent had hoped to
use in determining the bases of the gift and estate
taxes.
In a recent case, a split panel of the Second Circuit
vacated and remanded a Tax Court ruling that section
2036(a) required inclusion of a 49 percent tenant-incommon interest that a decedent had given to her son
in the final year of her life. The appeals court majority
opinion raises intriguing questions about how the
estate tax should apply to undivided real property
interests created by a decedent, particularly when the
co-tenants occupy a portion of the real estate together
both before and after the co-tenancy is created. This
report seeks to identify and answer some of the
questions that the circuit court decision has presented,
especially the apportionment issue that the circuit
court has directed the Tax Court to address on remand.
Copyright 2011 John A. Bogdanski.
All rights reserved.
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The Second Circuit has created a stir among
estate planning professionals with its decision in
Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner,1 vacating and
remanding a Tax Court ruling that had disallowed
valuation discounts for undivided interests in real
property by including the entire underlying property in a decedent’s gross estate for estate tax
purposes under section 2036(a). The appeals court
decision has been rightly hailed as a significant
victory for the taxpayer in the case, with implications worth considering beyond the specific facts
that gave rise to that dispute.
The decision, however, may not be as favorable
to taxpayers as some might think. The circuit court
panel split, with one of the three judges penning a
spirited dissent that may cause other courts to
approach the majority’s analysis with caution.
Moreover, the appeals court couched some of its
opinion in precatory language that gives the Tax
Court leeway to hold to its original line on a key
issue. Most importantly, the majority opinion leaves
many questions unanswered, and it may establish a
value apportionment regime that proves to be unworkable administratively.
This report examines Stewart, explores whether
the Second Circuit reached the correct result, considers what the Tax Court should do on remand,
and discusses the potential significance of the appeals court opinion for future cases, including some
not involving undivided fractional interests in
property. The report concludes that the discounts
ultimately enjoyed by the taxpayer in Stewart may
not be as great as some commentators assume.
However, the Second Circuit’s opinion could alter
in taxpayers’ favor the analysis under which section
2036(a) has been applied to family limited partnerships (FLPs), a popular estate planning technique.
I. Facts
The decedent, Margot Stewart, owned a brownstone on the East Side of Manhattan. She lived there
with her son, Brandon. The two resided in the lower
two stories of the building; the upper three floors

1

617 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010), Doc 2010-17740, 2010 TNT 153-7.
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II. Tax Court
The Tax Court held for the government in a brief
opinion.2 Judge Maurice Foley concluded that the
decedent’s retention of the income stream from the
brownstone was ‘‘very clear evidence’’ that she
retained ‘‘possession or enjoyment’’ of that property.3 He rejected as ‘‘not credible’’ the son’s testi-

mony that he and his mother agreed that they
would share the income and expenses from the
Manhattan and Hamptons properties ‘‘in a manner
reflective of their ownership interests.’’4 The son
had testified that the pair intended at year-end ‘‘to
perform a financial reconciliation’’ of the income
and expenses, but there was no written agreement,
and the son’s accountant ‘‘testified that he did not
recall being informed about’’ such an agreement.
The Tax Court found that no such agreement existed.5
III. Second Circuit Majority
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the
Tax Court’s decision. Judge Guido Calabresi, who
once taught estate and gift taxation at Yale Law
School, wrote the opinion for a majority of the
three-judge panel. Judge Debra Livingston dissented with a forceful opinion. The majority concluded that it was a clear error for the Tax Court to
hold that the decedent and son agreed that the
decedent would enjoy all of the ‘‘substantial economic benefit’’ of the son’s 49 percent interest in the
Manhattan property for purposes of section 2036(a).
The appeals court said that the son, and not the
mother, ‘‘manifestly enjoyed . . . the benefits of the
residential portion of the 49 percent.’’6 And as to the
upper floors, the majority declared, ‘‘it seems likely
that Decedent retained the benefits of less than the
total 49 percent.’’7
According to the appellate majority, the Tax
Court’s findings concerning the mother’s retention
of the brownstone rent and the absence of an
agreement to reconcile the books of the two properties ‘‘do not provide a complete picture of the
extent to which Decedent enjoyed the substantial
economic benefit of’’ the son’s 49 percent interest.
The court directed the IRS to ‘‘apportion’’ the
interest under a 1979 revenue ruling in which a
decedent was held to have retained only a portion
of the economic benefit from a transferred residence, when he retained the right to use it or rent it
out for only one month a year. By the same token,
the Second Circuit said, the Tax Court should
apportion the economic benefit of the brownstone
between its lower and upper floors. Only the upper
floors, it said, should be subject to section 2036(a).
Because the son was permitted to remain living
in the downstairs portion of the building along with

4
2

Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-225, Doc
2006-21773, 2006 TNT 206-14.
3
Id. at 6.

912

Id.
Id. at 7.
6
Estate of Stewart, 617 F.3d at 159.
7
Id.
5
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were rented to an unrelated commercial venture for
$9,000 a month, under a lease entered into 14
months before she died.
The decedent and the son owned, as joint tenants
with right of survivorship, property in the Hamptons, which they rented out to third parties. The
joint tenancy in the Hamptons property had been
created by the decedent by gift 11 years before she
died. The two cotenants agreed to, and did, share
the income and expenses from the Hamptons property equally.
In May 2000, four or five months after she had
been diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, the decedent executed a deed that transferred to the son a
49 percent interest in the Manhattan brownstone, as
tenant in common with the decedent. Despite this
transfer, the decedent retained all the rent from that
city property. She also paid most of the expenses
relating to the brownstone before she died —
$21,791 — whereas the son paid only $1,963 of
expenses during that period. The expenses were
abnormally high because repairs were necessary.
The decedent’s share of those expenses worked out
to 91.74 percent. After the brownstone gift and
before she died, her son retained all the rental
income from the Hamptons property, which was a
departure from prior practice.
When Margot died in November 2000, the entire
Hamptons property was includable in her gross
estate under section 2040, and her interest as tenant
in common in the Manhattan property was includable in her gross estate under section 2033. The IRS
and the estate, however, disagreed on whether and
to what extent the son’s interest in the Manhattan
property should be includable in the decedent’s
gross estate under section 2036(a). The estate took
the position that none of the son’s interest was
includable in his late mother’s estate — that only
her undivided 51 percent interest was includable.
The estate and the IRS stipulated that if this theory
was correct, the estate could value the decedent’s
undivided 51 percent interest at a 42.5 percent
discount from its pro rata share of the brownstone’s
underlying fair market value.
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value one would have paid to be Decedent’s
housemate from May 9, 2000, to November 27,
2000.10
Lastly, the appeals court turned to the potential
relevance of the Hamptons property. Although it
accepted the Tax Court’s finding that there was no
agreement that the income and expenses of the two
properties would be reconciled, the Second Circuit
declared that ‘‘it may be worth considering on
remand where the net income from the East Hampton property went.’’11 The majority noted that ‘‘consideration of other property may be useful to an
accurate determination of who enjoyed the substantial economic benefit of a property.’’ It went on to
give two examples of when that consideration
might or might not be appropriate:
If, for example, Brandon and Decedent had
formally split the rental income and costs of
the Manhattan property 51 percent-49 percent
but Brandon had allowed Decedent to take a
portion of what should have been Brandon’s
net income from the East Hampton property,
and that amount equaled the income Brandon
was entitled to from his 49 percent share of the
Manhattan property, then consideration of the
East Hampton property would be necessary to
prevent an abusive transaction that would
otherwise evade section 2036. At the other
extreme, if Brandon and Decedent had jointly
owned hundreds of other properties and there
was no particular reason to think that the
distribution of income from those properties
was in any way related to the substantial
economic benefit of the disputed property,
then it would be incorrect to consider such
other properties. We leave it to the Tax Court
to determine, on remand, where this case falls
along that spectrum and whether the distribution of net income from the East Hampton
property is among the ‘‘facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer and subsequent use of the property,’’ all of which
‘‘must be considered.’’12
In so holding, the Second Circuit rejected the IRS’s
view that when one is determining whether section
2036(a) should apply to a particular asset, the use or
enjoyment of other assets is never relevant.
IV. Dissent
Judge Livingston’s dissent was heated. She argued that the Tax Court was correct in holding that

8

Id. at 157 (emphasis in original; citation and footnote
omitted).
9
Id. at 160-161 (emphasis in original; citation and footnote
omitted).

10

Id. at 161, n.15.
Id. at 161.
12
Id. (citation omitted).
11
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the decedent, the majority concluded that inclusion
of that portion under section 2036(a) was inappropriate:
Like other courts, we draw a distinction between cases where a decedent retains exclusive possession and withholds possession
from the donee on the one hand, and ‘‘those
cases where a residence jointly occupied by the
donor and the donee has been held not includable in the donor’s gross estate’’ on the other.
This case is of the latter sort. And despite the
great burden faced by the taxpayer in all these
cases, taxpayers have won in every case of
which we are aware when those two crucial
factors were favorable.8
As for the upper floors, the appeals tribunal
instructed the Tax Court to re-examine a factual
finding that it made, namely, regarding the payment of expenses by the pair. While the decedent’s
payment of the lion’s share of the expenses supported the finding that the pair had an implied
agreement that she would enjoy the economic benefit of the property, the circuit majority also declared that the expenses she paid decreased the
economic benefit she received. Judge Calabresi explained:
For example, if A and B jointly own a rental
property that generates $10,000 per month in
rent and $5,000 per month in expenses, and A
and B split the rent evenly but B pays all the
expenses, then in substance A is getting the
entire economic benefit of the property while B
is getting nothing. Because ‘‘‘enjoyment’ . . . connote[s] substantial present economic benefit,’’ we think who paid what
expenses must be taken into account in apportioning the 49 percent interest between the
Estate and Brandon. In other words, the Tax
Court must determine who received what
portion of the net income from the 49 percent
interest, rather than the gross income.9
In a footnote, the majority added:
As used in the preceding sentence, ‘‘income’’
includes not only the dollars generated by the
rental portion of the 49 percent interest in the
Manhattan property (less, in the case of net
income, the expenses attributable to the 49
percent interest), but also Brandon’s imputed
income from living in the residential portion of
the property — that is, the fair market rental
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Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
14
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portion may have created an inference that she and
the son also considered her to have the right to
possess and enjoy all of the downstairs portion. The
majority impermissibly placed the burden of proving the existence of an implied agreement on the
IRS, the dissent said, when in fact the burden of
disproving the existence of an agreement was on
the estate. Moreover, the dissent did not buy the
majority’s conclusion that the son’s payment of
some of the expenses relating to the brownstone
supported the absence of an implied agreement;
although he was a 49 percent owner, he paid only
8.26 percent of the expenses.18
The dissent concluded:
It is not the job of this Court, of course, to close
loopholes that Congress has left in the tax
code. Here, however, the majority inexplicably
reopens a loophole that the legislature has, in
unmistakable terms, long since commanded
shut.
Evidence demonstrating the existence of a
genuine post-transfer tenancy in common certainly could weigh against the conclusion that
the transferor and transferee had an implied
agreement that the transferor would continue
to possess or enjoy the whole of a property. But
since in this case there is not only an absence of
such evidence, but the record actually shows
that the parties to the transfer did not behave
as though a tenancy in common had been
created and the transferor’s relationship to the
property did not, in substance, change, I cannot see how it was clear error for the Tax Court
to find that the estate failed to carry its burden
to disprove the existence of an implied agreement favoring the transferor with regard to
both the commercial and residential aspects of
this Manhattan townhouse. The majority’s reasoning, by focusing solely on Brandon Stewart’s residence at the townhouse as a tenant in
common as dispositive, not only departs from
prior case law and contravenes the text of
section 2036, but also thoroughly undermines
the statute, inviting inequitable disparities
among those subject to the estate and gift taxes
due to easy dodges by future tax avoiders.19
V. Analysis
A. Apportionment of Manhattan Property
In the course of the majority’s ruling that the
Manhattan property must be apportioned for purposes of inclusion under section 2036(a), it became

at 163 (emphasis in original).
at 165 (emphasis in original).
at 166 (citation omitted).
(citation omitted).

18

Id. at 169.
Id. at 170 (emphasis in original).

19
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the decedent had retained ‘‘not only the income
stream from the rent that was paid, but also the
substantial economic benefits of residence’’ in the
brownstone, because ‘‘her relationship to the property changed in not one significant respect from the
period preceding transfer to the period after.’’13 The
dissent asserted that the majority misread precedent, and ‘‘turns the proper — and longstanding
— construction of section 2036 on its head. It also
opens up a loophole that will vitiate to a considerable degree the efficacy of this section.’’14
The dissent objected to the majority’s reliance on
cases in which a decedent had transferred 100
percent of his interest in a family residence to a
family member but continued to live in it himself.
These cases, Judge Livingston said, held that the
continued occupancy was not in and of itself sufficient evidence of an implied agreement that the
decedent would enjoy the property to trigger application of section 2036(a). ‘‘The majority, conversely,
takes co-occupancy as sufficient evidence to prove
the absence of an implied agreement, at least with
respect to the residential portion of the property,’’
she wrote.15
The dissent also complained that the majority
impermissibly focused on what the son received
from the decedent, rather than what the decedent
retained. Citing New York property law, the dissent
observed: ‘‘As a tenant in common, Margot Stewart
retained the right, even after the transfer, to possess
and enjoy the whole of the Manhattan townhouse,
subject only to Brandon Stewart’s right to do the
same. It was thus wholly possible for her to retain
substantially the same possession or enjoyment of
the property that she had as the sole owner.’’16 In
some cases, the dissent reasoned, this retained right
might be negated by other factors ‘‘because the
tenancy interferes with the transferor’s subsequent
desire to sell the property, because the transferee
can himself file an action for partition, or simply
because the co-tenants’ desires for the day-to-day
use of an asset like a home are incompatible.’’17 But
the majority erred, Judge Livingston said, in holding that the pair’s co-occupancy of the lower floors,
in and of itself, negated the application of section
2036(a) to those floors.
The majority’s division of the property between
the rental floors and the residential floors was
incorrect, according to the dissent, because the
decedent’s retention of the rent from the upstairs

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

20

Id. at 163.
21
See reg. section 20.2036-1(b)(3) (‘‘it is immaterial . . . whether
the power was exercisable alone or only in conjunction with
another person or persons, whether or not having an adverse
interest’’).

excluded.22 Thus, as tenant in common, the decedent in Stewart had the right to use the entire
brownstone, as long as her son did not object. And
her need to obtain his consent to use the property
exclusively did not limit her right to enjoy the
property in a manner that should make any difference under section 2036(a).
This question was discussed but not completely
resolved in a 1992 Tax Court decision, Estate of
Powell v. Commissioner.23 There, a decedent gave
undivided tenancy-in-common interests in her residence to her children, retaining a 40 percent
tenancy-in-common interest for herself. She moved
out of the residence and into a retirement facility
shortly after the first of the gifts; neither she nor the
children lived in it thereafter. The Tax Court held
that the children’s interests were not includable in
the mother’s gross estate, on the ground that the IRS
had conceded the issue in a 1980 revenue ruling.24
As the Powell court acknowledged, however, the
1980 ruling did not even mention section 2036(a). It
said simply that under section 2033, a husband’s
gross estate included only his own tenancy-incommon interest, and not that of his ex-wife, when
the tenancy in common resulted from a tenancy by
the entirety that had originally been created by the
decedent when he purchased real property with his
own funds. The ruling seemed more concerned
with the possible application of section 2040(a),
governing joint interests with rights of survivorship, than any other estate tax issue. It also dealt
with former section 2515, now repealed, having to
do with gift tax. Nonetheless, the court in Powell
declared that the IRS had ruled out application of
section 2036(a) to the tenancy in common.
A 1956 decision, Estate of Trafton v. Commissioner,25 had more squarely rejected application of
the predecessor of section 2036(a) to a one-half
tenancy-in-common interest that the decedent had
given to his wife in securities, with the decedent
retaining the other half. The decedent in fact received and ‘‘used . . . as he pleased’’ all the income
from the securities. Nonetheless, the court held that
the spouse’s half-interest was not includable in his
gross estate, because his possession and enjoyment
of the funds was ‘‘wholly dependent on her consent’’ and subject to partition on her demand.
Estate of Trafton, if not simply incorrect, can be
distinguished on the ground that the assets at issue
were securities, whose only attribute subject to

22
See, e.g., Daly v. Shepherd, 645 S.E.2d 485, 486-487 (Va. 2007);
Barrow v. Barrow, 527 So.2d 1373, 1375-1377 (Fla. 1988); Rasmussen v. Thomas, 644 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Nev. 1982).
23
T.C. Memo. 1992-367.
24
Rev. Rul. 80-241, 1980-2 C.B. 273, 274-275.
25
27 T.C. 610 (1956).
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apparent that the Manhattan property was in fact
divided in three different ways: legal, physical, and
economic. The property was legally divided by the
tenancy in common into a 51 percent undivided
interest and a 49 percent undivided interest. Physically, it was divided into the lower floors, which the
decedent and the son continued to occupy, and the
upper floors, which were rented out to a business.
And economically, the majority divided the property into the net income retained by the decedent
and the net income enjoyed by the son, taking into
account in that calculation (according to the footnote) both the rental income from the upper floors
and the imputed income of living in the lower
floors. To understand fully the implications of Stewart, all three planes of apportionment are worth
considering.
1. Physical apportionment. The fundamental question on which the majority and the dissent disagreed was whether the physical division of the
property into upstairs and downstairs portions was
relevant for purposes of applying section 2036(a).
As the dissent pointed out, the decedent ‘‘created a
tenancy in common that guaranteed the transferor
continued access to the entirety of her property.’’20
In other words, unlike the decedents in most of the
other cases involving continued occupation of residences and section 2036(a), the decedent in Stewart
retained an interest as tenant in common in the
Manhattan brownstone. Should that fact alone not
have caused the entire Manhattan property to be
included in the gross estate — her own 51 percent
interest under section 2033 and the son’s 49 percent
interest under section 2036?
Section 2036(a) is notorious for including property in the gross estate if the decedent retains the
right to determine who should possess or enjoy the
property, even if that right can be exercised only
with the consent of an adverse party.21 Under
property law, a tenant in common typically has the
right to possess and enjoy the co-owned property as
completely as if she were the sole owner, provided
that such possession or enjoyment is not inconsistent with possession or enjoyment of the property
by the other co-owner. In most jurisdictions, each
cotenant must share with the other cotenant any
income actually derived from the property, but a
cotenant need not pay any rent or other amount to
the other cotenant in order to enjoy personal occupancy, as long as the other cotenant is not ousted or
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26

T.C. Memo. 2000-193, Doc 2000-17764, 2000 TNT 126-8.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 20.

27
28
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inapplicable, in large part because of the decedent’s
limited actual use of the property in question.
The dissent in Stewart conceded that tenancy in
common alone was not enough to trigger section
2036(a) inclusion. It suggested that section 2036(a)
would not apply if the cotenants were in disagreement about the day-to-day uses of the property, or
if either filed an action to partition the property and
terminate the cotenancy. But that concession seems
to have been misplaced. Section 2036(a) focuses on
what the decedent had the right to do, as well as on
what she actually did; and as noted earlier, it does
not matter whether an adverse party’s consent to
the decedent’s exercise of those rights must be
obtained. Thus, the better rule — the rule that seems
most consistent with established law involving section 2036(a) as it applies to trusts — would be that
with any retained tenancy in common in real property, the decedent has kept a forbidden interest that
triggers section 2036(a) inclusion.
The code reaches this result with a retained
interest as joint tenant with right of survivorship
under section 2040(a),29 and it seems logical to reach
it in the case of a retained tenant-in-common interest under section 2036(a) as well. After Stewart,
however, that clearly is not the prevailing rule, at
least not in the Tax Court and the Second Circuit.
And with no automatic inclusion of the entire
property, the door is left open for the type of
physical apportionment in which the appeals court
engaged.
2. Economic apportionment. The second plane on
which the Second Circuit majority concluded that
an apportionment was necessary was an economic
one. The court instructed the Tax Court to construct
a partial inclusion of the brownstone based on the
decedent’s and her son’s respective shares of the
‘‘net income’’ from the property, including the imputed income that the son enjoyed by living in the
downstairs quarters as his mother’s roommate.30
The appeals court gave the lower court little guidance on the algebra or other mathematics of the
calculation that it desired.
One uncertainty is that the court was not entirely
clear about whether this second type of apportionment was distinct from, or the same as, the division
between the residential and rental portions of the
brownstone. Given the court’s conclusion that the
downstairs was off limits to section 2036(a), one

29
In addition to pulling jointly held property back into a
decedent’s estate, section 2040 denies any discounts for the
disadvantages of co-ownership, even though those disadvantages are essentially the same with joint tenancy as they are with
tenancy in common. See Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 110 T.C.
297, 315-316 (1998), Doc 98-14934, 98 TNT 91-8.
30
Estate of Stewart, 617 F.3d at 161 n.15.
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enjoyment is income, for which tenants in common
are always accountable to each other. When real
property is involved, and when the cotenants have
rights of personal occupancy, there is no obligation
to account to each other for personal use of the
property. Section 2036(a) is phrased to cover either
the income from the property or the right, alone or
in conjunction with any other person, to designate
who gets to enjoy or possess the property. Tenants
in common clearly possess the latter right for real
property for which there is no lease or rental
arrangement involving a third party — exactly the
situation with the downstairs floors in Stewart.
Thus, it seems that section 2036(a) should have
applied in Stewart.
In a 2000 case, Estate of Wineman v. Commissioner,26 the IRS and the Tax Court assumed that the
decedent’s retained tenancy-in-common interest
was not, in and of itself, sufficient to trigger section
2036 inclusion when she died, and the court held
that the facts of the case did not warrant inclusion,
either. The decedent had given her three children
undivided interests in some cattle farm property;
their interests totaled 24 percent. The decedent
retained a 51 percent undivided interest, and a
testamentary trust established by her late husband
held the other 25 percent. After the gifts to the
children, the decedent continued to live in the
larger of two houses on the property, and she
continued to use the garden and small orchard next
to her house. The smaller house was occupied by
one of the children rent-free, and the children’s farm
corporation leased most of the rest of the property
from the co-owners — including barns, a granary, a
shop, cattle scales, and corrals — at below-market
rent, which the decedent apparently retained. The
Tax Court held that no inclusion under section
2036(a) was warranted.
The Wineman court’s discussion of section 2036(a)
is open to some question, however. It began by
noting that the IRS was attempting to include in the
decedent’s gross estate only the value of a life estate
in the 24 percent interest held by the children.27 If
section 2036(a) applied, one would have thought
that the entire value of the 24 percent interest would
be included. The court’s ruling also rested heavily
on its perception that the decedent held a ‘‘controlling interest’’ and the children held only a ‘‘minority’’ interest in the property,28 whereas the rights of
tenants in common to occupy personally the coowned property are ordinarily equal. Nonetheless,
the court clearly held that section 2036(a) was
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Table A
Item
Seven months’
upstairs rent at
$9,000/month
Imputed income from
seven months’
occupancy at
$6,000/month each
Less expenses
Net income
Percentage of net
income
Less interest actually
owned
Percentage of overall
property to be
included under
section 2036(a)

Mother

Son

Total

$63,000

$0

$63,000

$42,000
($21,791)
$83,209

$42,000
($1,963)
$40,037

$84,000
($23,754)
$123,246

67.51

32.49

100

(51)

(49)

(100)

16.51

0

0

indicating that Congress considers them two different attributes of property. The imputed income
approach monetizes possession or enjoyment and
then lumps it in with cash income, in seeming
contradiction of the congressional vision.
Moreover, although the regulations under section
2036(a) contemplate only partial inclusion when a
decedent retains ‘‘an interest or right with respect to
a part only of the property transferred by him,’’31
the type of income retention at play in Stewart may
not be the sort of partial retention to which the
regulation refers. In a case in which a decedent
retains a specified percentage or fraction of the
income from property, inclusion of only a ‘‘corresponding portion’’ of the property under section
2036(a) is appropriate. But in circumstances such as
those in Stewart, with expenses being covered by
the two cotenants in a haphazard fashion with no
fraction or percentage to guide the sharing, it is
debatable whether the estate can establish that the
income ‘‘from a part only of the property’’ was
retained. In an analogous setting involving spousal
trusts and the marital deduction, Congress and the
IRS have indicated that just because a dollar
amount of income is less than all of the income from
a specific asset, it does not necessarily constitute the
income from a ‘‘specific portion’’ of that property.32
A potentially more serious problem with economic apportionment is its complexity. How
Method 2 would be applied in a case in which the
decedent lived for a long time after creation of the
tenancy in common would be anyone’s guess.
Would one use average annual figures for the many
years in which the tenancy in common lasted? Only

31

Reg. section 20.2036-1(c)(1)(i) (second sentence).
See section 2056(b)(10); reg. section 20.2056(b)-5(c).

32
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might have thought that the threshold calculation
would have been an apportionment of the overall
fair market value of the real property between the
upper and lower floors, with only the upper portion’s allocation of value being subject to section
2036(a). If the Second Circuit’s required fraction is
to be applied only to the value of that portion, it
seems illogical to take the imputed rental value of
the lower floors into account in determining the
decedent’s retained portion of the upstairs. Alternatively, the appeals court may have been envisioning
application of a fraction to the overall value of the
entire building, in which case consideration of the
imputed income from the lower floors would be
more appropriate for purposes of deriving the
fraction.
For example, assume that the upper floors had an
FMV of $2 million, that the lower floors had an
FMV of $3 million, that the fair rental value of the
top floors was $9,000 a month, and that the fair
rental value of the lower floors was $12,000 a
month. One way of complying with the Second
Circuit’s mandate would be to focus only on the $2
million of value attributable to the top floors. The
decedent kept all the income from that portion of
the building, gross and net, and so one might think
that a 49 percent interest in the top floors would be
includable under section 2036(a), with the other 51
percent of the top floors being included under
section 2033. As for the downstairs, only section
2033 inclusion of the decedent’s 51 percent interest
would be permissible. For ease of reference, one can
label this method — physical apportionment of the
fee by floors — as Method 1.
However, the Second Circuit’s insistence on consideration of imputed income from the bottom
floors suggests that the threshold apportionment
just made between the overall values of the upstairs
and downstairs should not have been made. Instead, one should derive a fraction that would
apply to a partial interest in an underlying property
worth $5 million. A derivation of that fraction might
be found in Table A.
For ease of reference, one can refer to this method
— apportionment of the actual and imputed income
from overall fee — as Method 2. In this approach,
the actual rent from the upstairs floors would be the
initial line item. Apparently, the tenant in the actual
case did not make all of its required rent payments.
As mentioned earlier, the majority’s insistence on
consideration of imputed income from the son’s use
of the lower floors certainly seems misguided if the
percentage derived from the calculation is supposed to be applied just to the rental floors. It may
even be open to question as applied to the overall
property. Section 2036(a) uses the terms ‘‘income’’
and ‘‘possession or enjoyment’’ in the alternative,
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33
See Rev. Rul. 82-105, 1982-1 C.B. 133; Estate of Pardee v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 140, 150 (1967) (acq.) (inclusion under
section 2036(a); fixed amount could be spent each month to
discharge decedent’s support obligations); Estate of Sullivan v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-531, Doc 93-11823, 93 TNT 236-11
(to same effect, based on estimate of needs of decedent’s
spouse); United States Nat’l Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp.
332, 339-340 (D. Ore. 1960) (section 2036 case; decedent was
entitled to monthly payments of fixed amount for life); see also
Northeastern Pa. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 224-225
(1967) (6-3 decision) (valuation of spousal annuity interest for
purposes of old version of estate tax marital deduction under
section 2056(b)(5)).
34
Similarly, no discount is allowed in valuing successive
interests, such as life estates and remainders, in the presentvalue-based valuations of such interests using the tables prescribed by section 7520. When those tables apply, the values of
the various time-divided interests in a particular asset add up to
the value of the underlying asset itself. See, e.g., reg. sections
20.2031-7T(d)(2)(iii) (penultimate sentence) and 25.25125T(d)(2)(iii) (penultimate sentence).
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3. Legal apportionment. The last type of apportionment to be considered is the legal division of the
property into undivided tenancy-in-common interests, 49 percent transferred and 51 percent retained.
The Second Circuit’s holding accepted this division,
treating the cotenants’ interests as separate for
purposes of the estate and gift taxes. Both the
decedent’s lifetime transfer and the change of ownership brought about by her death were treated as
transfers of undivided interests, making both susceptible to valuation discounts. In contrast, by including the 49 percent interest in the gross estate,
the Tax Court negated the discounts. Property in the
gross estate is generally aggregated for valuation
purposes,35 and thus under the Tax Court’s view,
the 51 percent included under section 2033 was
merged with the 49 percent included under section
2036(a) and valued as outright ownership of the
entire fee interest in the brownstone.
B. Discounts on Remand
What will become of the estate’s valuation discounts on remand? Some commentators assume
that the 42.5 percent discount to which the parties
stipulated will be applied to all of the interests in
the property that wind up in the decedent’s gross
estate.36 That happy result for the taxpayer, however, does not seem guaranteed.

35
See Estate of Fontana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 318 (2002), Doc
2002-7744, 2002 TNT 61-11 (block of stock included in gross
estate under section 2033 aggregated for valuation purposes
with block of same stock included under section 2041); Estate of
Babbitt v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1270, 1277 (1986) (undivided
interests includable under section 2033 and former section 2035;
held, value of entire property was includable); Estate of Adler v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-28, Doc 2011-2166, 2011 TNT
21-10 (no discounts for undivided one-fifth interests transferred
to decedent’s children during his lifetime, where decedent
retained possession and enjoyment of property until his death,
triggering section 2036 inclusion); Rev. Rul. 79-7, 1979-1 C.B. 294
(closely held stock includable under section 2033 and former
section 2035); LTR 9403002, 94 TNT 15-17 (closely held stock,
sections 2033, 2038); TAM 9146002 (undivided interests in
residence, sections 2036, 2035(d)(2), 2038), TAM 9140002 (undivided interests in real estate, sections 2033, 2044); TAM 8330004
(options to purchase closely held stock, sections 2033, 2041). But
cf. Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996), Doc
96-16744, 96 TNT 111-13 (per curiam) (for valuation purposes,
no aggregation of qualified terminable interest property included under section 2044 with surviving spouse’s own assets);
Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26 (1999), Doc
1999-3887, 1999 TNT 17-6 (acq.) (following Bonner); Estate of
Lopes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-225, Doc 1999-23452,
1999 TNT 131-8 (same); Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1999-15, Doc 1999-3888, 1999 TNT 17-7 (same).
36
See Jones and Mitchell, ‘‘A Divided Second Circuit Fractionalizes Section 2036 in Estate of Stewart,’’ 113 J. Tax’n 220
(2010); Beers, ‘‘Stewart Est. v. Comr.: Second Circuit Reverses Tax
Court Finding of ‘Implied Agreement’ to Retain Benefit of
Transferred Property for Purposes of Section 2036(a),’’ 35 Tax
Mgmt. Est., Gifts & Tr. J. 289 (2010).
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the largest annual figures from the period? Total
amounts over the entire period? Only the figures
most in the government’s favor, because the taxpayer ordinarily bears the burden of proof?
A third possible approach to the economic apportionment mandate — call it Method 3 — would be
to treat the net income enjoyed by the decedent as
akin to an annuity, and to determine how much
‘‘corpus’’ it would take to generate that annuity
indefinitely. This is the approach taken under section 2036(a) when the grantor of a trust retains a
fixed annuity payment right that does not in fact
end before his death. Those cases often result in less
than the full corpus of the trust being included in
the gross estate.33
In the current example, using the hypothetical
cash and imputed income combined, the decedent
was enjoying $83,209 of periodic net income when
her 51 percent share as tenant in common would
have been only $62,855 ($123,246 times 51 percent).
Thus, the portion of her son’s income that she
retained was $20,354. Assuming an applicable rate
under section 7520 of 7.2 percent (which is the rate
actually in effect at her death), the amount needed
to generate net income of $20,354 indefinitely
would be a mere $282,694. No discount would be
available for this amount,34 but it would be a
considerably smaller inclusion under section
2036(a) than under either Method 1 or Method 2.
Here again, however, complexity rears its ugly
head. Because the sharing of the income and expenses between mother and son was determined on
the fly, selecting the appropriate dollar figures to be
plugged into the calculations would be far more
problematic — perhaps impossibly so — if the
decedent had lived a much longer life and operating results varied from year to year.
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Moreover, depending on how the Tax Court
performs the economic apportionment calculation
discussed earlier, it may turn out that discounts
apply only to the residential portion of the property.
For example, assume that the Tax Court uses
Method 1. In that case, the upstairs portion of the
house would wind up in the gross estate in its
entirety: 51 percent under section 2033 and 49
percent under section 2036(a). Under that characterization, the entire rental portion would be included,
with no discount for undivided interests. Assuming
as in the preceding example that the upstairs had an
FMV of $2 million and the downstairs an FMV of $3
million, only the downstairs living space would be
subject to a discount; the $2 million for the upper
floors would be included in the gross estate without
diminution for the legal division of the property. In
other words, while the legal apportionment (undivided interests) results in discounts, the physical
apportionment (upstairs and downstairs) may not.
Assuming a 42.5 percent discount on the downstairs portion, the overall amount included in the
gross estate would be $2,879,750, computed as
follows:
Table B
Value

Upstairs

Downstairs

Total

Base value
Percentage
included
Pro rata
value
Discount
at 42.5%
Amount
included in
gross estate

$2 million

$3 million

$5 million

100%

51%

—

$2 million
Not
applicable

$1,530,000

$3,530,000

($650,250)

($650,250)

$2 million

$879,750

$2,879,750

37

Estate of Stewart, 617 F.3d at 154 n.9.
See Tax Court Rule 91(e) (court may permit party to
withdraw stipulation ‘‘where justice requires’’).
38

Note that the discount’s inapplicability to the
upstairs would result in an increase to the gross
estate of 42.5 percent of 51 percent of $2 million, or
$433,500. Viewed a slightly different way, the
$650,250 discount would be only 18.42 percent of
the total pro rata value of the combined interests
included in the gross estate.
The IRS might seek to defeat or diminish the
discount even if an economic apportionment is
employed along the lines of Method 2. Recall that in
that income-focused approach, a percentage was
derived that would be applied to the overall value
of the entire property. Because the value of the
overall property is the base, it is not certain that the
product of the percentage and the overall value
should then be discounted to reflect undivided
interests. For example, having decided that the
proper inclusion percentages were as determined
earlier, the Tax Court might apply them to the full
FMV of the brownstone, without additional discounts, on the ground that the income approach is
akin to the annuity calculation in Method 3, which
does not allow for discounts. The result would be as
follows:
Table C
Percentage actually owned, included under
section 2033
Percentage of overall property included
under section 2036(a)
Total percentage included in gross estate
Base value of brownstone
Amount included in gross estate

51%
16.51%
67.51%
$5 million
$3,375,500

On the other hand, although Method 2 applies a
single percentage to the overall value of the brownstone, perhaps the Tax Court could be persuaded to
allow a discount against the resulting figure on the
ground that less than the entire property is being
included in the gross estate. Whether the 42.5
percent discount stipulated on account of the legal
apportionment (undivided interests) truly represents the appropriate discount for the economic
apportionment (income), however, would be open
to serious question.
In any event, for the sake of illustration, if the
42.5 percent discount were allowed from the
$3,375,500 result reached, the discount would
amount to $1,434,588, and the total amount included in the gross estate under sections 2033 and
2036 would be $1,940,912 — a considerably better
result for the estate than under Method 1.
Finally, Method 3 would treat the decedent as
retaining for section 2036(a) purposes only the
amount of corpus needed to generate the hypothetical annuity that she was drawing from the son’s
interest. That would be added to the amount included in her gross estate under section 2033 on
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First, the Second Circuit itself appeared to leave
open the possibility that the IRS may back out of the
stipulation now that the appeals court’s views of
the case are known. ‘‘We express no view whether
the 42.5 percent discount is a correct figure, or
whether on remand the Government remains
bound by its stipulation,’’ the appeals court majority said in a footnote.37 Having held entirely for the
IRS in its original opinion, and having received a
seemingly new legal standard from the appellate
tribunal, perhaps the Tax Court will be amenable to
withdrawal of the stipulation in the second goround.38
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Table D
Amount included under section 2036(a)
Pro rata value of 51% interest included
under section 2033 ($5 million times .51)
Less discount on 51% interest at 42.5%
Total amount included in gross estate

$282,694
$2,550,000
($1,083,750)
$1,748,944

Summing up all the approaches and comparing
them with the estate’s originally desired outcome in
Stewart, one reaches the following array of outcomes:
Table E
Total Amount
Included in
Gross Estate

Method
Method 1 (partial discount)
Method 2 (with no discount)
Method 2 (with full discount)
Method 3 (partial discount)
Taxpayer at trial
($5 million x 0.51 x 0.575)

$2,879,750
$3,375,500
$1,940,912
$1,748,944
$1,466,250

As can be seen, although the Second Circuit’s
decision is a significant victory for the taxpayer (the
IRS and the Tax Court would have included $5
million in the gross estate), it is likely not a total
victory. And the remand could result in widely
varying results, depending on the details of the
apportionment method selected.
C. The Hamptons Property
As if the uncertainty of its apportionment holding were not trouble enough, the Second Circuit
majority also left open whether the pair’s treatment
of the Hamptons property should play a role in the
section 2036(a) calculus. The appeals court said that
the issue ‘‘may be worth considering on remand.’’39
Given the brevity of the Tax Court’s original opinion in the case, it seems to be the last thing on earth
that the trial judge would want to do.
What should the Tax Court think about in making that determination? As discussed earlier, the

circuit court posed two hypotheticals, which it saw
as being at opposite extremes. The first, in which
the court thought that consideration of the Hamptons property would be relevant to the Manhattan
property, was:
Brandon and Decedent had formally split the
rental income and costs of the Manhattan
property 51 percent-49 percent but Brandon
had allowed Decedent to take a portion of
what should have been Brandon’s net income
from the East Hampton property, and that
amount equaled the income Brandon was entitled to from his 49 percent share of the
Manhattan property.40
Is there any chance that the facts of Stewart fit this
fact pattern? They might, if the extra income (above
his share) that Brandon kept from the Hamptons
property ‘‘equaled’’ the extra income (above her
share) that the decedent kept from the Manhattan
property. Without knowing the amount of rental
income derived from the Hamptons property,
which neither court opinion supplied, it is impossible to make this call. But another important unanswered question is whether the Second Circuit is
referring to exact equality, or something close to
exactly equal. In any event, barring extraordinary,
heretofore undisclosed agreements between mother
and son, any equivalence in the two amounts
would seem completely serendipitous.
The other extreme scenario, which seems clearly
inapplicable, was: ‘‘Brandon and Decedent had
jointly owned hundreds of other properties and
there was no particular reason to think that the
distribution of income from those properties was in
any way related to the substantial economic benefit
of the disputed property.’’41 The brownstone and
the Hamptons property appear to have been the
only co-owned parcels that the pair had. Thus, the
easiest case for keeping the properties separate in
the estate tax analysis was not present. Nonetheless,
it seems likely that on remand the Hamptons property will turn out to be irrelevant.
D. Effect on FLP Jurisprudence
Although the facts of Stewart may not be commonplace, the Second Circuit opinion may be significant
in future application of section 2036(a) to a frequently used discount planning device: FLPs. In
recent years, section 2036(a) has been the IRS’s most
potent weapon for negating the valuation discounts
that FLPs and similar family investment entities are
designed to generate. In many, if not most, of the
cases in which the Tax Court has held that section

40
39

Estate of Stewart, 617 F.3d at 161.
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account of her own 51 percent undivided interest in
the brownstone. It seems appropriate to allow a
discount for the decedent’s own 51 percent interest
under this method, since the apportionment approach respects the legal division of the property
into tenancy-in-common interests. As to the section
2036(a) inclusion of a portion of the son’s share of
the property, however, in keeping with the precedents from which the annuity approach is drawn,
no discount would be permitted. The result would
be as follows:
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2036(a) drew back into the gross estate the assets
that a decedent had transferred during her lifetime
to the FLP, the Tax Court has noted that the decedent’s ‘‘relationship to’’ the transferred assets
‘‘did not change’’ between the time of their contribution to the FLP and the decedent’s death.42
That is the same language the Tax Court used in
Stewart, and indeed, as Judge Livingston’s dissent
stressed, the facts of Stewart strongly supported that
characterization. After the gift to her son, the decedent lived in the brownstone just as she did
before, and she kept all the rent from the brownstone just as she did before. The only thing different
that occurred following the gift was that the son
paid some of the expenses attributable to the
brownstone, in effect increasing the decedent’s beneficial enjoyment of the property. Despite these
damning facts, the Second Circuit majority held that
not all of the brownstone should be included in the
decedent’s gross estate. Under the same rationale,
not all of the assets a decedent transferred to an FLP
might properly be includable in the gross estate
under section 2036(a).
VI. Conclusion
Exploring the Second Circuit’s decision in Stewart is not unlike peeling an onion. In addition to the
physical apportionment issue on which the majority and the dissent faced off, the court raised many
questions that the parties and the Tax Court must
address on remand. Although out-of-court settlement of these issues would doubtlessly be welcomed by the trial judge, observers of the valuation
scene will likely be rooting for another judicial
opinion — or two.

42
See generally John A. Bogdanski, Federal Tax Valuation, paras.
4.03[4][c][viii]-[xii] (1996 and supps.).
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